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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE DETECTION OF MARIJUANA BY
DoGs-United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1121 (1976).

TRAINED

Our society has witnessed, in recent years, the growing menace
of drug abuse in the United States.' In an effort to curb the distribution and sale of controlled substances such as marijuana, police
have resorted to novel means of ferreting out concealed drug caches.
The use of specially-trained animals to detect odoriferous drugs
among the personal effects of suspicious persons is currently favored
by both courts and law enforcement agencies. Recently, in United
States v. Bronstein,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the use of specially-trained dogs to detect
odors emanating from personal baggage consigned to a public carrier is not a search constitutionally protected by the fourth
amendment.
I.

FACTS

The defendants in Bronstein purchased tickets at the San
Diego, California airport as strangers, but were later seen talking
together as if they were old friends. An observant airline employee
regarded this as suspicious behavior and notified Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) personnel, who dispatched agents to the defendants'
destination, the Windsor, Connecticut terminal. One agent was accompanied by Meisha, a German shepherd specially trained to detect marijuana odors. As the baggage was placed on the conveyor
belt, Meisha reacted positively to two pieces of baggage among fifty
other pieces. The dog sniffed vigorously and nipped and bit, but did
not otherwise alter the baggage. When the defendants claimed the
baggage, they were placed under arrest, and only then did they
freely and voluntarily consent to a search of their suitcases. Inside
each suitcase the agents found about sixty pounds of marijuana.2
On appeal, the defendants contended that the use of a trained
dog to inspect baggage was a search within the protection of the
fourth amendment, and that in their own case this action constituted a warrantless search and seizure without probable cause,
1. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4567.
2. 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1121 (1976).
3. This case involved two instances or procedures which may have constituted a search.
The first is the employment of Meisha to detect any odor of marijuana emanating from the
luggage. The second instance is the search incident to the apprehension of defendants by DEA
agents. This second search will not be considered as the appellate court's holding is based
upon findings of fact which were not "clearly erroneous." Also, the consent doctrine, or
"incident to lawful arrest" doctrine, are not the focus of this casenote.
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requiring exclusion of the evidence seized. Affirming the lower
court's holding, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
the contention that use of a canine's senses to detect odors is violative of the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment.
The court found, inter alia, that the sniffing, nipping and biting at
the luggage by Meisha was not tantamount to a search and mentioned that the contention had been described as "nonsense" in the
lower court' and "frivolous" in the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia.5 The opinion by Judge Mulligan stated that detection of
odoriferous drugs by the use of canine senses is not different in kind
from the use of police officers' own olfactory senses and, while perhaps a technical trespass, Meisha's biting at the baggage did not
expose the contents of the bag and could not sensibly be characterized as a search or seizure. The court disagreed with the contention
that police are limited to their own individual senses, noting that
the use of "sense-enhancing" instruments to aid efforts to detect
contraband does not constitute an impermissible fourth amendment search. Implicit in the majority's reasoning was a "plain
smell" theory7 analogous to the open view doctrine.' Finally, the
court found that the defendants could have no reasonable expectation of privacy where they transported baggage by plane, because
public safety precautions compel continual scrutiny of passengers
and their effects.'
4. 521 F.2d at 461.
5. United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
6. 521 F.2d at 462.
7. See Comment, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 410, 422-27 (1976).
8. The "open view" doctrine holds that objects discovered in open view from a lawfully
occupied vantage point are not "searched" and may be seized upon a valid warrant or on
exigent circumstances justifying the failure to obtain a warrant arising from inadvertent
discovery. See Annot., 29 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1971).
9. 521 F.2d at 462. Circuit Judge Mansfield submitted a concurring opinion which
distinguished use of sensitive animals to detect slight odors, from cases which sanction the
enhancement of human senses by the use of instruments such as binoculars. He compared
the majority's opinion of Meisha's inspection to that of "plain view," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (1971), rather than that of a search, stating at 464,
[The police agents'] own senses were replaced by the more sensitive nose of the dog
in the same manner that a police officer's ears are replaced by a hidden microphone
in areas where he could not otherwise hear because of the inaudibility of the sounds.
The illegality of the latter practice in the absence of a search warrant or special
circumstances has long been established. (citation omitted).
Further, Judge Mansfield could not distinguish the effect of Meisha's search from that of a
magnetometer. "[Elach detects hidden objects without actual entry and without the enhancement of human senses. . . . [T]he important factor is . . . the fact of the intrusion
into a closed area otherwise hidden from human view, which is the hallmark of any search."
He noted that marijuana does not present the danger found to justify searches of boarding
airline passengers.
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II.

DEFINITION OF A SEARCH

Generally speaking, a "search" is a matter of invasion and
quest and involves an examination or inspection of a person, his
property, or his effects.' However, the determination of whether an
act constitutes an unreasonable search must stand or fall on the
facts of each case." No literal or mechanical approach should be2
adopted in determining what may constitute a search and seizure.,
Traditionally, an unconstitutional search had been held to occur
when a constitutionally protected area was invaded by an agent of
the state without a warrant.'" The landmark case of Katz v.
United States4 superseded this line of authority, holding that the
"trespass" doctrine was no longer controlling. Katz enunciated the
principle that:
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [blut what he

seeks to preserve as private, even in5 an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.'

Thus, the location of a container is immaterial if its owner justifiably expects the enclosure to be free from governmental intrusion.
For example, even in the absence of physical intrusion or technical
trespass into a given enclosure, fourth amendment protection extends to the recording of overheard oral statements. Detection of
the odor emanating from the defendants' suitcases in Bronstein can
easily be analogized to the amplification of Katz's voice inside the
telephone booth. On that basis, then, the Second Circuit could have
found a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Furthermore, cases involving use of a magnetometer to detect
metal had previously held that use of such an instrument, which
7
does not enhance the senses, is a search. In Bronstein, the Second
Judge Mansfield based his opinion on his belief that "one who consigns luggage to the
common baggage area of a public carrier . . . cannot expect to enjoy as much privacy with
respect to his person or property carried by him personally into, on or from the carrier or
facility." He concluded that the court should strictly limit a search to cases where there is
probable cause similar to or stronger than in the instant case.
10. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
11. United States v. Lewis, 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
12. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States,
13.
316 U.S. 129 (1940).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 351.
16. Id. at 353.
17. State v. Damon, 18 Ariz. App. 421, 423, 502 P.2d 1360, 1362 (1972):
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Circuit found the use of X-ray machines or magnetometers to be
searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment."8 Nevertheless, Judge Mulligan distinguished the use of police dogs and magnetometers, 9 by reasoning that the magnetometer has been used as
an indiscriminate device against all passengers without probable
cause, and discloses metal items upon the person where there is a
normal expectation of privacy. Meisha, by contrast, detected marijuana pursuant to a surveillance of baggage undertaken only upon
reliable information. This analysis, however, did not address the
threshold question of whether a search had occurred.
III.

THE PLAIN VIEW AND OPEN VIEW DOCTRINES

The Bronstein court relied upon an apposite line of authority
to support the finding that canine assistance was not a search.2
Those cases held that where certain sense-enhancing instruments
were used to aid in the detection of contraband, their use did not
constitute a search because any objects discovered were always
clearly visible with the aid of the instruments. The rationale was
that since the discoveries precede any intrusion, no constitutional
violation of the protected area occurred. The court relied upon four
cases. United States v. Lee, 2' generally referred to as the first plain
view case,2 2 involved detection by the coast guard with the aid of a
search-light, of cases of contraband whiskey on the deck of defendant's boat. The Court held that the use of a search-light was comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass and was not
prohibited by the Constitution.23 United States v. Hood 24 held that
where an officer shined his flashlight into a car and saw vials of pills
in "plain view," the act did not constitute a search because what
he saw was encompassed within the plain view doctrine. In United
We can see no difference between an intrusion into the defendant's handbag by means
of an electronic device rather than an actual physical intrusion by opening the handbag
and conducting a physical search. The very purpose and function of the magnetometer
is to search for metal and disclose its presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy.
Accord, People v. Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 306 N.E.2d 777, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1973); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert: denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
18. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974). See also United States v.
Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770.
19. 521 F.2d at 462, 463.
20. 521 F.2d at 462 n.3 (use of boat searchlight, flashlight, binoculars; generally characterized as "sense-enhancing" instruments).
21. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
22. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 n.2 (1975).
23. 274 U.S. at 563.
24. 493 F.2d at 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974).
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States v. Minton,2 5 officers aided by binoculars viewed cartons of
illicit liquor being unloaded from a truck. The court held the subsequent seizure of the whiskey in the truck was within the plain view
doctrine. Finally, Cobb v. Wyrick" concerned the inadvertent discovery of spent shell casings in defendant's backyard by an officer
using a flashlight. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the officer's discovery did not constitute a search. On appeal, the district
court approved the application of the plain view doctrine but found
that the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether
the officer was lawfully upon the premises.
These four cases purport to invoke the plain view doctrine in
instances where objects are open to view only with the aid of devices
which enhance the sense of sight. The term "plain view" has caused7
some confusion among the courts in these "open view" situations.
The true plain view doctrine was enunciated in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire.2 '
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.2"
The doctrine will justify a seizure only when the police have a prior
3
justification for an intrusion, ' when the incriminating nature of the
3
object seized is immediately apparent, ' and when its discovery is
inadvertent.2 The doctrine is not applicable to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something in33 nor may it be invoked until after an
criminating at last emerges,
34
initial search has occurred.
As the Coolidge plain view doctrine is clearly not applicable to
Meisha's pre-intrusive and deliberate plain smell discovery, it appears that the court was actually invoking the open view theory. As
enunciated in Lee, ' observation from a place which does not violate
25.
26.
27.
28.

488
379
See
403

F.2d (4th Cir. 1973), (per curiam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
Comment, 13 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 410, 421-23 (1976).
U.S. 443, rehearing denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).

29. Id. at 466.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 469-71.
33. Id. at 466.
34. See Moylan, supra note 22.
35. It appears that the dicta in Lee may be interpreted as authority for open view, plain
view, and search incident to arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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the curtilage of the subject's dwelling is not forbidden by the fourth
amendment because there is neither unauthorized physical
penetration into the premises nor actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. However, this doctrine is largely discredited
by modern authority following Katz."
Despite Katz's discrediting of the trespass approach to search
analysis and hence implicit rejection of the open view doctrine
which is based on lack of physical intrusion, the Second Circuit
based its decision on a derivative of the open view doctrine; i.e., the
plain smell theory. Regardless of Katz, it is true that the open view
theory has been extended to the use of senses other than sight to
establish probable cause for arrest. 7 Yet, no amount of probable
cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent exigent circumstances, even where the article is contraband." Therefore, in
cases following Lee it was necessary to find that, for example, where
a searchlight fell upon an incriminating object or an object otherwise came into the view of an officer, the discovery was not a
"search. ' ' 31 The Bronstein court's finding that
the use of trained
dogs to seek out an odoriferous drug did not constitute a search, is
understandable in light of the court's reliance on the open view
cases, but fails to take into account the effect of Katz upon that
theory.
In addition to relying upon a discredited doctrine, the Second
Circuit failed to support its decision adequately by harmonizing the
36. See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1973). See United States v. Kim, 415 F.
Supp. 1252 (D.C. Hawaii 1976), where the warrantless use of a high power telescope and
binoculars to view activities within an apartment from a distant vantage point was held
unconstitutional. The court stated, "[a] 'plain' plain view of Kim's apartment was impossible; only an aided view could penetrate. . . . [TIhe 'plain' in plain view must be interpreted
as permitting only an unaided plain view." Id. at 2015.
37. Probable cause for arrest on the basis of odor of narcotics has been found in the
following cases: United States v. Martinez Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Troise, 483 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1973); Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008
(1966); United States v. Fischer, 38 F.2d 830 (M.D. Pa. 1930); United States v. Pagas, 395
F. Supp. 1052 (D.P.R. 1974); Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 226 Pa. Super. 372, 314 A.2d 27
(1973).
Contra, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (dictum); Taylor v. United States,
286 U.S. 1 (1932); United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1974); United States
v.
Lewis, 392 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 956
(1968); United States v. Kaplan, 89 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum).
38. State v. Morris, 42 Ohio St. 2d 307, 333, 329 N.E.2d 85, 101 (1975) (dissenting
opinion); accord, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.
39. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). These cases were also relied upon as
authority for the plain view doctrine enunciated in Coolidge.
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facts of the open view cases with the facts in Bronstein."'Speciallytrained dogs with the ability to perceive odors undetectable by humans, cannot realistically be characterized as sense-enhancing instruments in the same category as flashlights or binoculars. The
police agents in Bronstein did not smell or see any contraband, nor
4
were their own senses enhanced or magnified. Thus, the open view
theory, assuming arguendo it had been a viable alternative for the
court, should not have been applied to these facts.
Invocation of the open view theory leads one to the coordinate
holding that a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of pri4
vacy toward an object when it is open to view. " Accordingly, the
court held that Bronstein and his codefendant could not have had
a legitimate belief that the suitcase would not be inspected and
3
hence, could not claim constitutional protection. The Katz decision holds, however, that the location of an object is not determinative of whether such a belief is justified." Also, the contents of a
5
parcel do not affect the scope of protection.1 A briefcase has been
found to be an article one reasonably seeks to preserve as private,
regardless of its location" and warrantless searches of baggage have
7
been held invalid in a variety of instances. However, certain lim40. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (opinion of Brandeis, J.); United
States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974); United States
v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Cobb v. Wyrick,
379 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
41. See note 9 supra; accord, State v. Elkins, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 311, 1 Ohio Op. 3d
380, 382, 354 N.E.2d 716 (1976).
42. Accord, United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1974) where defendant
who boarded train with suitcases containing marijuana did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy from drug agents with an inquisitive sense of smell.
43. United States v. Missler, 414 F.2d 1293 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970). The protection under the fourth amendment extends only to those situations in which
the complainant had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy.
Generally, it has been held that the capacity to claim the protection of the fourth
amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures depends not upon a property
right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a
reasonable expectation of freedom from Governmental intrusion ....
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368,(1968).
44. What a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Bronstein
defendants attempted to disguise the odor of marijuana with moth balls packed within the
suitcase.
45. United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). The fourth amendment provision precluding unreasonable searches and seizures of persons, their houses, papers and
effects is sufficiently broad to afford protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
to all types of property even though contraband of any type or obscene in nature.
46. United States v. Michelli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973).
47. United States v. Jellsett, 448 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Search of
defendant's suitcase was held invalid where the search was not incident to arrest, the suitcase
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ited searches have been upheld when necessary to further the public
policy of preventing hijacking.48 It is significant that such policy
considerations were not raised in Bronstein."°
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the open view theory is not appropriate in cases where
human senses are not enhanced, and since one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding baggage consigned to a carrier,
especially after arrival, the Bronstein decision can best be explained
by the recent national effort to curb the traffic in drugs, 'e including
marijuana as well as more dangerous narcotics. In light of this fact,
the search of baggage without a warrant upon a tip from an informant may be considered a necessary step in furthering the national
interest. Such public policy is not, however, expressed in the opinion. But, although it is impossible to actually determine the motivation of courts to permit inspections of personal items without constitutional protection, it seems reasonable to expect that as public
opinion becomes more tolerant toward use of marijuana, courts may
find inspections such as that involved in Bronstein to be searches
requiring satisfaction of fourth amendment requirements.
Charles Fred Alibery III
was not at the time of search within area of defendant's immediate control, and there was
no probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. United States v. Anderson, 500
F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 760 (1974). Warrantless search of
baggage which defendants claimed and which they had checked at airport held unconstitutional.
United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973). Warrantless search of defendant's luggage which had been checked with airline could not be justified as an administrative search pursuant to regulations where it was unrelated to airport screening program which
was designed to catch potential hijackers by searching carry-on luggage. United States v.
Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973). When defendant no longer wished to board plane, search
of his baggage without his consent was unreasonable.
48. An individual's expectation of privacy in an airline terminal is not the same as that
in a street or park when considered in light of the increase in aircraft piracy, the dangers
presented to innocent bystanders and the inherent difficulty in preventing hijackings. People
v. Lee, 108 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1973).
49. Bronstein also did not address the presence of exigent circumstances which might
validate an unwarranted search upon probable cause. Such a discussion is therefore beyond
the scope of this casenote. However, two cases may deserve attention: State v. Matthews,
216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974) (4-3 decision), considered facts very similar to Bronstein, but at
a bus depot, and held that the "automobile exception" as an exigent circumstance does not
apply to a package in the custody of a common carrier. In United States v. Lonabaugh, 494
F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1973), where officers had control over baggage about to be loaded on a
plane, an unwarranted search and seizure is unconstitutional. No exigent circumstances were
present which excused the failure to obtain a warrant where officers stated they had good
relations with airline personnel and where nothing would have prevented them from detaining
the suitcases while a warrant was being obtained. Cf. United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d
1311 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Garay, 477 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1973).
50. See note 1 supra.
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